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I. Introduction and Summary of Conclusions
A.

Issues
This memorandum examines the doctrine of head of state immunity and how it may

affect the Iraqi Special Tribunal in the prosecution of Revolutionary Command Council
members. The memorandum’s second part gives a brief factual background of the situation in
Iraq as it applies to the issue of immunity. The third part describes the doctrine of immunity’s
history. The fourth part determines whether immunity applies to former heads of state and other
former leaders. The fifth part examines whether the doctrine of immunity can be used as a
defense against violations of international humanitarian law. The sixth part continues the
discussion whether there are exceptions to the doctrine of immunity and describes how waivers
of head of state immunity would apply as a form of exception. The seventh part looks to
whether the Iraqi Special Tribunal is an international or domestic court and how that could affect
the application of head of state immunity and the court’s authority therein.
B.

Summary of Conclusions
(1) The Coalition Provisional Council has the authority to allow the Iraqi
Special Tribunal to prosecute heads of state and former heads of state because
the Statute for the Iraqi Special Tribunal should be deemed a waiver of
immunity by the competent domestic authorities.

The doctrine of immunity is not considered to be a right but a privilege, which can be
waived by national governments. The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) eliminated head of
state immunity as a defense.

It permits prosecution of “any Iraqi national or resident of Iraq

accused of the crimes listed…”1 in accordance with the Coalition Provisional Authority and Iraqi
Governing Council’s wishes as expressed in the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal. The Iraqi

1

Transitional Administrative Law (2004) Art. 1(b). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook I at Tab 21]

1

Special Tribunal (IST) has the authority to prosecute former heads of state because there is no
absolute right to retain head of state immunity with former heads of state and standing heads of
state subject to similar immunity limitations.
The Coalition Provisional Authority created the IST and the Transitional Government
later approved it after the American Coalition’s occupation ended and sovereignty passed to it.
Sometime in the near future, the IST will be ratified by a democratically elected government in
some form and a new constitution will replace the TAL.
(2) Because no head of state enjoys criminal immunity in his or her own
country’s courts when that nation has ratified a treaty to such effect, the
Iraqi Special Tribunal can prosecute all crimes prohibited in the treaties to
which Iraq is a party.
Even if the Coalition Provisional Authority lacked the authority to waive head of state
immunity, there is no immunity for actions that contravene a treaty or other agreement that
provides certain international humanitarian duties, specifically the affirmative obligation to
prosecute violators. Membership in the United Nations and partisanship to treaties such as the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime Against Genocide and the Geneva
Conventions requires prosecution of international crimes without regard to the status of the
accused.
(3) The Iraqi Special Tribunal can prosecute heads of state because
immunity cannot be used as a defense when wrongs of an international
nature are committed.
Even if it lacks the authority to waive immunity, the Coalition Provisional Authority
could still grant the IST the authority to prosecute heads of state. Neither heads of state nor
former heads of state enjoy immunity for violations of international humanitarian law because
they are acts of a criminal nature deemed outside the scope of official functions.

2

(4) Although the Iraqi Special Tribunal would have different authority
depending on whether it is an international or domestic court, prosecution of
heads of state is possible under either.
While this memo does not conclude whether the IST is an international or domestic court,
it outlines the implications of each interpretation. Head of state immunity can be waived as a
defense using different procedures under domestic and international courts. Accordingly, either
assertion will allow the possibility of prosecuting the Revolutionary Command Council
members.

II. Factual Background
A.

The 1970 Iraqi Interim Constitution
The 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States and its “coalition of the willing” brought

down the Ba’athist Government of Saddam Hussein that had led Iraq since 1968. Until the
invasion, the Iraqi Interim Constitution of 1970 governed. 2

Article 40 of that document

protected the leaders of Hussein’s regime from prosecution, “[t]he President of the Council of
Revolutionary Command, his deputy and the members shall enjoy full immunity and no measure
may be taken against any one of them except by prior permission from the Council. 3
B.

The Transitional Administrative Law
The occupying nations, led by the United States, determined to re-build Iraq as a

democratic nation after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime and eliminate the former abusive
government’s vestiges, recognized that justice was the only way. The United Nations Security
Council passed a resolution in 2003 “affirming the need for accountability for crimes and

2

See Wikipedia Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_Special_Tribunal. [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook II at Tab 43]
3

Iraqi Interim Constitution (1970) Art. 40. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook I at Tab 8]

3

atrocities committed by the previous Iraqi regime.” 4 When the Transitional Administrative Law
(TAL) was penned in 2004, it moved toward such accountability by eliminating the defense of
head of state immunity.

Article 24(C) states that, “[n]o official or employee of the Iraqi

Transitional Government shall enjoy immunity for criminal acts committed while in office.” 5
Also, Article 6 allows the Iraqi Special Tribunal to “take effective steps to end the vestiges of the
oppressive acts of the previous regime.” 6 Because a new Iraqi constitution has not been written
by the newly elected government it is not certain whether it will replace the TAL. Accordingly,
when the new constitution is ratified it could have significance.
C.

The Iraqi Special Tribunal
The Iraqi Governing Council issued the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal:
The official position of any accused person, whether as president, prime minister,
member of the cabinet, chairman or member of the Revolutionary Command or
Council, a member of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party Regional Command or
Government (or an instrumentality of either) or as a responsible Iraqi Government
official or member of the Ba’ath party or in any other capacity, shall not relieve
such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment. 7

This statute intends to eliminate immunity and pave the way for prosecution of all Iraqi leaders
for crimes committed during Hussein’s reign. Whether the IST will have its intended impact will
be fully determined by how the statutes are interpreted by the justices of the IST in light of many
precedents that will be discussed in this memo.

4

S.C. Res.1483, U.N. Doc S/RES/1483 (2003). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook I at Tab 15]

5

Transitional Administrative Law at Art. 24. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook I at Tab 21]

6

Id. at Art. 6.

7

Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal (2003), Art. 15(c). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook I at Tab 19]
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III. The Doctrine of Immunity
A.

Historical Background
The traditional doctrine of state sovereignty/ comity
Sovereign immunity was traditionally one aspect of a “sovereignty package” that each

nation-state enjoyed. Included in this package are the notions of equality of states, prohibition of
interference within other states and immunity for the sovereign and its heads of state. 8 The
doctrine of immunity is grounded in the notion of comity, providing each individual nation with
sovereignty within its borders and free to govern itself and its people without interference from
outsiders. The doctrine of comity suggests that "[e]ach state protects the immunity concept so
that its own head of state will be protected when he or she is abroad." 9
Customary international law of state immunity prevents states from exercising control
over the public acts of other states and entitles leaders and diplomats of individual nations to
immunity from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of foreign states.10 Comity allows that the
laws of one sovereign nation should not be used to control other nations or their leaders’ actions.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity also rests on the principle that nations and officials have
equal standing, making it unfair to settle disputes in the courts of either. 11
B.

A Changing Doctrine: Historical Perspective
1. A New Accountability for Leaders

8

Michael Kelly, Nowhere to Hide (Peter Lang Publishing- USA) (forthcoming Sept. 2005) at 67-8. [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook II at Tab 39]
9

Michael P. Davis, Accountability and World Leadership: Impugning Sovereign Immunity, 99 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1357
(1999). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook II at Tab 46]

10

Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the International Criminal Court, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 407 (2004).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook II at Tab 44]
11

Kerry Creque O'Neill, A New Customary Law of Head of State Immunity?: Hirohito and Pinochet 38 Stan. J. Int’l
L. 289 (2002) at 292. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook II at Tab 51]
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Originally and traditionally, the doctrine of head of state immunity was considered
absolute. Interpreting the doctrine has become problematic in recent years for several reasons.
Despite the theory’s establishment among international law norms, there is a lack of clear
statutory guidelines for enforcement of head of state immunity. 12

Uncertainty also exists

regarding the permitted level of international reproach and the degree that state sovereignty
boundaries can be compromised to reach what has become an acceptable level of accountability
for the world’s nations’ leaders.
2. Holding Heads of State Responsible- The International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg
Following World War II, the world first chose to recognize the atrocities of war that that
must not be excused through immunity. The Allied Powers, upon confronting the horrors of the
Holocaust, decided for the first time to set up a court to try those responsible for the destruction.
The rationale behind holding leaders accountable was that their influence led those beneath them
to act as they did, so shielding the leaders from justice would counter the new view that certain
crimes were universally condemnable. The Charter of the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg states that, “[t]he official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or
responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from
responsibility or mitigating punishment.” 13 As Robert Jackson, chief prosecutor for the United
States at the Nuremberg Tribunal noted, “[i]n prohibiting the plea of ‘acts of state’ as freeing
defendants from legal responsibility, the charter refuses to recognize the immunity once enjoyed

12

David K Pansius, Ved. P. Nanda, Litigation of International Disputes in U.S. Courts, ß 16.2 (2004). [Reproduced
in accompanying notebook II at Tab 41]
13

Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Annex to the London Agreement (8 Aug. 1945), 82
U.N.T.S. 279, Art. 7. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook I at Tab 4]

6

by criminal statesmanship.” 14 The future Justice Jackson also noted that, “[i]t is quite evident
that the law of the charter pierces national sovereignty and presupposes that statesmen of the
several states have a responsibility for international peace and order, as well as responsibilities to
their own states.”

15

In 1946, a year after the Nuremberg Charter was established, the UN

General Assembly affirmed the sentiments that certain offenses “against the peace and security
of mankind” were of “primary importance,” and violators must be brought to justice. 16 The
Principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal, adopted by the International Law Commission of the UN
in 1950, explicitly state, in Principle III:
The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime under
international law acted as Head of State or responsible government official does
not relieve him from responsibility under international law. 17
There can be no doubt that those who established the first International War Crimes Tribunal and
UN members explicitly intended that no head of state should ever be able to use their official
status as a defense against prosecution for international crimes.
3. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East similarly aspired to
bring about justice for Asia following World War II. To eliminate head of state immunity, it
stated that:
Neither the official position, at any time, of an accused, nor the fact that an
accused acted pursuant to order of his government or of a superior shall, of itself,
be sufficient to free such accused from responsibility for any crime with which
14

Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials :
London, (1945).
Available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/jackson/preface.htm [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook I at Tab 12]

15

Id.

16

UN General Assembly Resolution 95(I) (1946). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook I at Tab 24]

17

Principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal (1950). Available in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1950,
vol. II and http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/nurnfra.htm [Reproduced in accompanying notebook I at Tab 10]
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he is charged, but such circumstances may be considered in mitigation of
punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires. 18
Establishing the International Military Tribunal for the Far East reinforced the notion that
immunity would no longer protect heads of state from prosecution of international crimes.
C.

The Analogy to Diplomatic Immunity
Diplomats have been afforded immunity as early as ancient Greece, the Middle East,

China and India because such figures have been viewed as being their nations’ representatives,
governed exclusively by the laws of their native jurisdiction. 19 Because of diplomatic relations’
importance, it is not only in the best interests of all nations to have such persons protected, it is
also in accordance with the doctrine of comity. The present day embodiment of these sentiments
can be found in the Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations, that grants limited immunity
from criminal and civil jurisdiction . 20
D.

21

Head of State Doctrine and the Road to Restrictive Immunity
1. The Origins of the Head of State Doctrine
The sovereignty of a nation has long been viewed as including its leaders as the state’s

embodiment. France’s King Louis XIV eloquently observed, “l’etat, c’est Moi.” 22 The basis for
granting heads of state immunity is similar to the reason that a sovereign would assert it. Lord
18

Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19 & Apr. 26, 1946, Art. 6, TIAS No. 1589, 4
Bevans 20. Available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imtfech.htm [Reproduced in accompanying notebook I
at Tab 3]
19

Davis, supra note 9. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook II at Tab 46]

20

The Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502 article 31(1). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook I at Tab 22]
21

Article 31 of the Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations allows several exceptions to immunity, including for
actions relating to real property, as well as commercial and professional activities which are conducted outside
“official functions.”
22

Michael J. Kelly, Can Sovereigns Be Brought to Justice? The Crime of Genocide’s Evolution and the Meaning of
the Milosevic Trial, 76 St. John’s L. Rev. 257 (2002). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook II at Tab 49]
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Saville noted in the final Pinochet decision that, historically, the doctrine of state immunity
declared that “states were the only actors on the international plane; the rights of individuals
were not the subject of international law.” 23 Being embodied as leader as the state, it would be
“an affront to the dignity and sovereignty of the state which he personifies and a denial of the
equality of sovereign states to subject him to the jurisdiction of the municipal courts of another
state, whether in respect of his public acts or private affairs.” 24 Today, the rationale often cited
is the notion of comity- the reciprocal nature of immunity that enables the accomplishment of
leadership duties without any interference by other nations.
2. Absolute and Restrictive Immunity
Absolute immunity grants a head of state total exemption from prosecution with no
exceptions. The idea behind absolute sovereign immunity was allowing rulers to lead their
countries free from other nations’ reproach. In 1812, the United States Supreme Court ruled that
sovereigns and heads of state were absolutely immune from the jurisdiction of American courts,
unless the foreign state chose to make an exception. 25
In National City Bank of New York v. The Republic of China et al, the United States
Supreme Court elaborated on the right of granting exceptions, thereby declaring a doctrine of
restrictive immunity. 26 The Court reasoned that “implied consent by the territorial sovereign to
exempt the foreign sovereign from its 'exclusive and absolute' jurisdiction” could be understood
“from standards of public morality, fair dealing, reciprocal self-interest, and respect for the
23

R v Evans and others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte; R v Bartle and others, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), 6
BHRC 24 (1999). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook II at Tab 37]
24

Id.

25

The Schooner Exchange v M’Faddon, et. al. 11 U.S. 116 (1812). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook II at
Tab 38]
26

National City Bank of New York v. The Republic of China et al, 348 U.S. 356 (1955). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook I at Tab 30]
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'power and dignity' of the foreign sovereign.” 27 In other words, immunity could be limited by
the nation that grants it.
E.

Private Acts Versus Official or Public Acts
A distinction has been drawn between a head of state’s official and private conduct.

Exceptions to head of state immunity have been established since World War II.

The idea of

restrictive head of state immunity originally allowed for exceptions in commercial transactions
and acts of a private character, where courts may distinguish between official conduct (jure
imperii) and acts undertaken in a personal capacity (jure gestionis), granting immunity only to
public or official acts. 28

29

These exceptions demonstrate that a head of state may be prosecuted

only for actions taking place in his or her private life, such as in the context of a commercial
contract.
Although analogies have been made between diplomatic and head of state immunity to
clarify the latter, problems occur in distinguishing official from private acts, in addition to
differences between respective responsibilities. 30 Under a doctrine of absolute immunity all
duties within the official role were absolved, but more recently criminal acts have been viewed

27

Id. at 428.
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Gilbert Sison, A King No More: The Impact of the Pinochet Decision on the Doctrine of Head of State Immunity,
78 Wash. U. L.Q. 1583 (2000) at 1586, [Reproduced in accompanying notebook II at Tab 54] and Kelly, supra note
8 at 74. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook II at Tab 39]
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BHRC 24. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook II at Tab 37]
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as exclusively private, and therefore are prosecutable. 31 Also problematic is the lack of a single
set of statutory guidelines governing head of state immunity, as can be found with diplomats. 32
The reasoning behind conferring immunity to official acts is that they are generally
regarded as acts of state for which the state, and not the official, should be held responsible.
When an international rule establishes that an official ought to be held personally responsible for
an act, the reason for immunity disappears because the official acts as an individual rather than
embodying the state. 33 This would be the case with criminal acts, considered prosecutable
because they cannot be official acts of state. The British House of Lords held in the first
Pinochet decision that because Augusto Pinochet’s acts were international crimes, not acts of
state, immunity would not protect him. 34
Both the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium
(also known as the Yerodia case,) and the Law Lords in the last Pinochet decision decided in
favor of granting immunity to heads of state for acts committed outside official responsibility. 35
While these decisions are not binding on the IST, they are persuasive authority.

IV. Whether Immunity Applies to Former Heads of State

31

Sison, supra note 28, [Reproduced in accompanying notebook II at Tab 54] and Kelly, supra note 8. [Reproduced
in accompanying notebook II at Tab 39]
32

O'Neill, supra note 11 at 291. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook II at Tab 51]

33
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R v Evans and others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte; R v Bartle and others, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, (No. 1), 5
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A.

Do Former Heads of State Retain Immunity?
Iraq may have eliminated immunity for sitting heads of state through the Transitional

Administrative Law and the Statute of the Iraq Special Tribunal. However, accused parties
might argue that this waiver is not based on the defendants’ status as former heads of state.
Several courts have contributed to the continuing argument of whether exceptions to immunity
should be maintained regardless of whether a head of state continues to hold office, or their term
of office has ended.
B.

Former Head of State Immunity Retained- The Yerodia Case- Democratic
Republic of Congo v. Belgium
The nation of Belgium accused former leader Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi of inciting

racial hatred by making speeches in violation of the Belgian Act on the Punishment of Grave
Breaches of International Humanitarian Law. 36 The Act asserts universal jurisdiction over grave
breaches of international humanitarian law and states that, “[t]he immunity attributed to the
official capacity of a person, does not prevent the application of the present Law.” 37 Belgium
asserted that Mr. Yerodia enjoyed no immunity at the time he allegedly committed these acts and
that there was a lack of evidence that he acted in any official capacity.38 Congo argued that the
Belgian court, in asserting jurisdiction, violated the principle of state sovereignty, and “that a
State may not exercise its authority on the territory of another State and of the principle of

36

Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium, 41 I.L.M. 536. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook I at Tab
26]
37

Belgium: Act Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 38 I.L.M. 918
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sovereign equality among all Members of the United Nations, as laid down in Article 2,
paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations.” 39
The Democratic Republic of Congo brought a case against Belgium before the ICJ
because Belgium attempted to assert jurisdiction over Congo’s former leader by issuing an
international arrest warrant against Mr. Yerodia for alleged violations of international
humanitarian law. The ICJ held that the actions of Belgium violated a legal obligation by failing
to respect the immunity from criminal jurisdiction that the former Minister for Foreign Affairs
retained under international law. 40
In holding that Belgium violated the sitting Minister for Foreign Affairs’ immunity, the
ICJ made clear that head of state immunity lasts only for the duration of a term of office. 41
While this opinion acknowledged the issue of international crimes as a possible exception to
head of state immunity, it did not rule on any specific effects such exceptions would have once a
head of state has left office.
The ICJ acknowledged that Belgium attempted to assert universal jurisdiction over
certain crimes that have long been recognized as having characteristics of jus cogens 42
violations. President Guillaume of the ICJ noted, however, that the development of international
criminal courts was a remedy for national court deficiencies and that “the rules governing the
jurisdiction of international courts as laid down by treaty or by the Security Council of course

39

Id. at para. 1.

40

Id. at para. 78.

41

Id.
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have no effect upon the jurisdiction of national courts.” 43 He also stated that “a State normally
has jurisdiction over an offence committed abroad only if the offender, or at the very least the
victim, has the nationality of that State or if the crime threatens its internal or external security.
Ordinarily, States are without jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad as between
foreigners.” 44 Despite striking a blow to national courts seeking to assert jurisdiction over
international law violators who hide behind head of state immunity, the Law Lords failed to
strike that same blow regarding former heads of state.
C.

The Schizophrenic British House of Lords on Head of State Immunity- The
Pinochet Cases
1. Background
Augusto Pinochet ascended to power in 1973 through a military coup by overthrowing

the democratically elected government of President Salvador Allende. Despite his actions, many
countries recognized Pinochet as the legitimate head of state of the State of Chile. Pinochet
remained president until 1990, when he stepped down and assumed the position of “Senator-forLife.” 45 On October 22, 1998, Spain issued a warrant for the arrest of Pinochet and requested his
extradition from England, where he was receiving medical attention under the assurance of
British authorities that his status as a former head of state would protect him. The warrant stated
five offenses, including torture and hostage taking. After the Court of the Queens Bench
Division granted immunity to Pinochet, Spain appealed to the House of Lords. 46

43

Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium, 41 I.L.M. 536 at para 11. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
I at Tab 26]
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2. Former Head of State Immunity Rejected- Pinochet I
The House of Lords determined the scope of immunity of a former head of state from
criminal processes of British law. In making their decision, the Lords considered whether
Pinochet was entitled to immunity with respect to extraditable crimes. 47 The Lords applied the
following section of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations:
When the functions of a person enjoying privileges and immunities have come to
an end, such privileges and immunities shall normally cease at the moment when
he leaves the country, or on expiry of a reasonable period in which to do so, but
shall subsist until that time, even in case of armed conflict. However, with
respect to acts performed by such a person in the exercise of his functions as a
member of the mission immunity shall continue to subsist. 48
Applying these words, the Lords interpreted the British State Immunity Act of 1978 as intending
to invoke restrictive immunity. The Act states that the “immunities and privileges conferred” to
“the sovereign or other head of that State in his public capacity” are subject to “any necessary
modifications.” 49 The Lords interpreted those words to mean that:
A former head of state shall continue to enjoy immunity from the criminal
jurisdiction of the United Kingdom with respect to acts performed by him in the
exercise of his functions as a head of state. 50
The Lords also considered whether the crimes allegedly committed by Pinochet could be
included as part of his official duties, which is examined in section VI. While the Lords decided

47

Amber Fitzgerald, The Pinochet Case: Head of State Immunity within The United States, 22 Whittier L.R. 987
(2001) at 1000. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook II at Tab 47]
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that Pinochet retained immunity as a former head of state, they held that because of the nature of
his actions, his immunity would not prevent him from being extradited. 51
D.

The International Criminal Court’s Rejection of Former Head of State Immunity
The Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court states explicitly:
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on
official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government,
a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a
government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility
under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of
sentence.
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity
of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court
from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person. 52

The words “without any distinction” might be interpreted to include former heads of state,
because no explicit mention is made of such parties in the charter. The intent seems to apply
jurisdiction to “all parties” for all actions done under “official capacity,” including former and
sitting heads of state alike.
E.

Whether Immunity Applies to Former Iraqi Heads of State
1. Answering Whether Immunity Has Been Retained or Waived
The precedents established by the Yerodia and Pinochet cases can be viewed as affecting

the Iraqi situation in several ways. One interpretation of the cases would hold that former heads
of state always retain immunity and cannot be prosecuted. The second is that they retain
immunity, but if the nation that granted them immunity in the first place chooses to waive that
51
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immunity, as it would with a head of state that continues to hold office, it could do so. In
addition, the fact that the crime might be such that it was not included in their official duties
could allow exception to such immunity.
2. Interpretation Number One: Former Iraqi Heads of State Retain their Immunity
Any former Iraqi heads of state and other top officials could make a convincing argument
that they retain their immunity granted under the 1970 Iraqi Interim Constitution. The Yerodia
and Pinochet I holdings apply because the Revolutionary Command Council members were
essentially deposed when the American Coalition invaded. Accordingly, the immunity they had
as heads of state will continue upon becoming former heads of state. That the actions they will
be prosecuted for were done under color of their official duties could strengthen their arguments,
as stated in Pinochet I. To counter these arguments, examinations of the defendants and the new
government’s sovereign actions with respect to waiver are necessary.
3. Interpretation Number Two: Former Iraqi Heads of State Do Not Retain Their
Immunity
Other interpretations of the Pinochet and Yerodia holdings indicate that former Iraqi
heads of state might not retain immunity. The Iraqi Special Tribunal asserts jurisdiction only
over its own citizens and nationals. Chile retained the right to prosecute its former leader, a
national, in its own national courts. While it later did extradite Mr. Pinochet, the British court
did not state any obligation to do so. The British Court simply refused to extradite Mr. Pinochet
for a domestic trial in Spain to be held upon the basis of universal jurisdiction. The Lords
approved the extradition under the Torture Convention, which constituted a form of waiver. The
ICJ similarly declined to grant Belgium the right to assert universal jurisdiction in its own courts
over the foreign ministers of another nation. The ICJ’s argument is one of state sovereignty;
nations should not be permitted to bring other nations’ former heads of state into their domestic
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courts. As Michael Davis notes, “justice may best be served by allowing Chile to take care of its
own problems. Indeed, even the slightest respect for state sovereignty compels one to consider
that an individual nation may be best equipped to heal its own wounds...” 53 Since none of the
Revolutionary Command Council members are sitting heads of state, their immunity has lapsed
and prosecution should be permitted. Also, the new Iraqi government will have the right to draft
a constitution to eliminate the immunity rights of its own heads of state as the TAL does,
constituting waiver.
The Pinochet and Yerodia holdings should also be viewed as distinctive and affecting
only foreign domestic courts wishing to assert universal jurisdiction, and not applicable to
internal national courts or international courts.

This type of interpretation would allow

international courts, such as the International Criminal Court or ad hoc Tribunals, to assert
jurisdiction over heads of state for international crimes. Further, the alleged actions were
criminal and should not be considered as falling within official duties because crimes can never
be part of an executive’s “official duties.” Because the Iraqi Special Tribunal does assert
jurisdiction over universal crimes, these holdings have different implications depending on
whether the court is considered an international or a domestic court.

V. Whether Head of State Immunity Can be Used as a Defense When Wrongs of a Serious
Nature are Committed
A.

International Crimes Defined
For a crime to be considered an international crime, it must be considered a violation not

only of customary international law, but also of jus cogens norms. 54 As David Pansius and Ved
Nanda note, “[o]ne can argue that no official, head of state or otherwise, can engage in gross
53
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violations of customary international law in general, and human rights in particular.” 55 The
reason for this is given by Professor Michael Kelly, who remarked
The political will has finally been summoned to pursue those in power
who monstrously direct forces under them to commit genocidal atrocities. Now it
can be legally asserted that blood on the hands of lieutenants travels back up the
chain of command to their masters and stains them most assuredly as if the
masters had committed the physical acts themselves. 56
Leaders whose influence led those beneath them to act as they did, must be held accountable for
encouraging the commission of universally condemnable crimes.
B.

Exceptions to Immunity- Genocide and Other International Crimes
As mentioned earlier, exceptions to immunity are made in certain cases of special subject

matter jurisdiction, namely crimes of an international nature. Professor Westbrook of the State
University of New York at Buffalo notes:
At some fundamental level, international law scholars appear to have
subordinated the doctrine of state sovereignty to international law's prohibition on
genocide, a position which has been explicitly taken by Michael Glennon:
'Intrastate genocide is no longer entitled to the protection of sovereignty.' 57
A general norm has been established that rulers can no longer hide behind the doctrine of
absolute sovereignty.

While the international community’s abhorrence against those who

commit such atrocities was stated during the Nuremberg trials, the mantra of “never again” has
not held true.

Heads of state continue to attempt to hide behind domestic laws to protect

themselves from prosecution for the worst crimes humans have committed against other humans.

1. International Crimes Punished in an International Court- The Nuremberg Tribunal
55

David K Pansius, Ved. P. Nanda, The Law of Transnational Business Transactions, ß 15.3 (2004). [Reproduced in
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The Nuremberg Charter was the first time immunity was removed in an international
setting for crimes committed by heads of state while in office. The world community found
these crimes to be of such a reprehensible nature that they were deemed international crimes, and
as such, enumerated in the Charter. The Tribunal was given jurisdiction over all individuals so
that they could no longer evade criminal responsibility, be they heads of state or someone else.
The Tribunal conferred individual responsibility for crimes against peace, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity. As Robert Jackson explained, the authority of Nuremberg to try these
specific crimes was not new, because “[t]hose acts which offended the conscience of our
people… [were] criminal by standards generally accepted in all civilized countries.” 58

To

support his assertion that these crimes had long been officially vilified, he cited precedent from
the Hague Conventions of 1907 concerning war crimes which listed “the laws of humanity,” the
Geneva Protocol of 1924 which declared that “a war of aggression constitutes… an international
crime,” and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 which renounced war. 59 In noting the seriousness
of these crimes, the future Justice Jackson said that “[s]ociety as modernly organized cannot
tolerate so broad an area of official irresponsibility.” 60
Following in the footsteps of the Nuremberg Tribunal are several other courts that
similarly outlaw international crimes. The Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court,
and the Statues for the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia
all list as violations of international humanitarian law the crime of genocide, breaches of the
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Geneva Conventions, crimes of war, and crimes against humanity. 61 On the other hand, the
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone limits itself to only crimes against humanity,
Geneva Convention violations, and “other serious violations of international humanitarian
law.” 62 Each court also has provisions denying head of state immunity.
2. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the
United States Courts- Kadic v. Karadzic
Upon finding that subject matter jurisdiction existed, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that Radovan Karadzic, a former President of the self-proclaimed
Bosnian-Serb republic Srpska, was not immune from service of process because he “may be
found liable for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in his capacity as a state
actor.” 63 The Court disagreed with the notion that international law applied only to state actions,
and called all international crimes violations, regardless of whether they were committed
privately or as acts of state. 64
The Plaintiffs in this civil trial were able to bring this claim of alleged genocide, rape,
forced prostitution and impregnation, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment,
in addition to other crimes, under the Alien Tort Act, which grants federal subject-matter
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jurisdiction for law of nations and United States treaty violations. 65 Finding that these acts were
international humanitarian law violations, the court emphasized the Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, which states that, "[i]ndividuals may be held liable
for offenses against international law, such as piracy, war crimes, and genocide." 66
The crimes listed in the Statute of the IST include several international crimes that the
court found to be violated by acting heads of state in Karadzic including genocide and various
crimes included within the definitions of crimes against humanity and war crimes. 67 Iraq is also
a party to the Genocide Convention and must be held accountable for breaches. The Karadzic
holding should be applied as persuasive authority in establishing accountability for international
law violations.
3. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s Indictment of
Slobodan Milosevic- Prosecutor v. Milosevic
Slobodan Milosevic was President of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
during a time of extreme conflict between the Bosnian, Serb, and Croatian populations that,
having persisted for over one-hundred years, boiled to a bloody head beginning in 1991, leaving
thousands dead, including women, children, and elderly citizens. 68 The international crimes
uncovered led the United Nations Security Council to establish the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in May, 1993, through adoption of Resolution 827. 69
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The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia states that,
“[t]he International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory in accordance with the
provisions of the present Statute.”70 The statute includes within its subject matter jurisdiction
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, violations of customs of war, genocide, and
crimes against humanity. 71 It also states that, “[t]he official position of any accused person,
whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not
relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.” 72
The Prosecutor for the ICTY indicted Milosevic in 1999 for war crimes and crimes
against humanity during the second NATO bombing campaign and he was arrested in 2001.
While his criminal trial continues to unfold at the time of this writing, the Prosecution stated in
the indictment regarding Milosevic’s responsibilities as a head of state, that
In as much as he had authority [¶30 states that he had de facto and de jure control]
over the [52nd Corps of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]
VJ and police units, other units or individuals subordinated to the command of the
VJ in Kosovo, Slobodan Milosevic, as President of the [Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia] FRY, Supreme Commander of the VJ and President of the Supreme
Defense Council, is also, or alternatively, criminally responsible for the acts [¶54
asserts crimes against humanity] of his subordinates, including members of the VJ
and aforementioned employees of the Ministries of Internal Affairs of the FRY
and Serbia, pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Tribunal Statute. 73
Professor Michael Kelly articulated this series of events most succinctly when he wrote that it is
“the very fact of Milosevic's arrest and prosecution as a former head of state that is of utmost
importance.
70

The trial’s outcome is of secondary significance.

Amenability to a court's
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jurisdiction equates to legal responsibility for one's actions while in office.” 74 Even though he
may not ultimately be found guilty, Milosevic was forced to answer for his alleged actions in a
court of law without the defense of head of state immunity.
The ICTY followed through on its goal of accountability for individual crimes in a court of
law, regardless of whether one is an acting or former head of state. The Iraqi Special Tribunal
will in turn have an opportunity to indict and try its former heads of state for international
crimes, as its intentions are stated in its Statute. In indicting Milosevic, the ICTY gave teeth to
the principle of UN’s Resolution that because such crimes are statutorily and internationally
condemned, no head of state will be able to escape prosecution. For justice to prevail in Iraq, the
tribunal should follow the model of the ICTY.

VI.

Whether Head of State Immunity Admits the Exception of Waiver

A.

Ownership of Immunity Rights and How Immunity Might be Waived
Immunity is not an individual's right but a privilege belonging to the individual's state.

Accordingly, the state may bestow or retract immunity. 75 Consequently, a head of state or
former head of state may lose immunity for acts committed while in office if the current
government waives such immunity. 76 The waiver of head of state immunity is analogous to that
of diplomatic immunity, which “may be waived by the sending State,” as is stated in the Vienna
Convention of Diplomatic Relations. 77

The Vienna Convention stipulates that waivers of

immunity must be express, although a court might interpret the existence of an implied waiver
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based on the legislative intent. 78 If a nation elects to bestow upon an individual the privilege of
immunity, it may revoke said right for a variety of reasons.
B.

Whether Immunity Can Be Lifted By Treaty
1. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
In addition to acting as a waiver of immunity, the Convention on the Prevention and

Punishment of the Crime of Genocide “obligates nations to enact legislation to fulfill this treaty
[prevent genocide] and make penalties for violations.” 79 The treaty says that the state must have
a competent tribunal in the territory for the alleged crimes or allow an international court to have
jurisdiction. 80 Every state party to the convention has an affirmative duty to take steps to prevent
the act of genocide and prosecute violators if found within the domestic territory.
By ratifying the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
the United States enabled the plaintiffs in Kadic v. Karadzic to sue an acting head of state under
the Alien Tort Act. In becoming a party to the treaty, nations automatically waive immunity in
accordance with Article 4:
Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III
shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public
officials or private individuals. 81
The Second Circuit District Court held that the alleged atrocities were actionable under the Alien
Tort Act to the extent that they were committed in pursuit of genocide or war crimes and
otherwise may be pursued against Karadzic to the extent that he is shown to be a state actor. 82
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The results of this case may be limited though, because Karadzic was not a recognized head of
state.
In addition to the jurisdictional statements included in the Statute for the Iraqi Special
Tribunal, the nation of Iraq is a party to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, having ratified it on January 20, 1959. 83 Treaties that include a waiver of
head of state immunity obligate their parties to uphold such waivers. This doctrine was used by
the U.S courts in interpreting the Genocide Convention in Kadic, and by the British courts
regarding the Convention Against Torture in Pinochet III. Because of its status as a party to the
Genocide Convention, Iraq continues to have an affirmative duty to obey it. Accordingly, Iraq
must prosecute all genocide violations.
2. The Geneva Conventions
Outlining laws related to the treatment and protection of people and property during
wartime, the Geneva Conventions obligate states to prosecute alleged violations in its Grave
Breaches provisions. 84 Article 146 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in the Time of War specifically states that legislation must be enacted to effect
sanctions against violators. Therefore, affirmative steps must be taken to suppress violations. In

addition,
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons
alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave
breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its
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own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its
own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another. 85
Because Iraq is a state party to this convention, it must take steps to prevent “grave breaches” of
the Geneva Convention, including “willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including
biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health…” 86
among other international crimes. As Professor Michael Scharf points out, “the official history
of the negotiations confirms that the obligation to prosecute is ‘absolute,’ meaning, inter alia,
that state-parties can under no circumstances grant perpetrators immunity or amnesty from
prosecution for grave breaches of the Conventions.” 87
3. The Torture Convention as Waiver- ex Parte Pinochet- Pinochet III
The final and deciding Pinochet case focused on the fact that both Chile and the United
Kingdom ratified a treaty waiving head of state immunity. In addition to the issue considered in
the first Pinochet case, in the third Pinochet case the Lords articulated a second basis for their
holding to determine the point that British law required extraditable crimes to be criminal, at the
commission or the extradition request date. 88 The Law Lords noted that as of 1988, Chile, the
UK, and Spain had all ratified the Torture Convention.

This convention included a non-

immunity clause. The Lords therefore held that Pinochet was extraditable for acts of torture
occurring only after that date. 89 The Lords applied a three-step process. First, the general rule is
that immunity extends to heads of states for both criminal and civil liability. Second, as to
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whether former heads of state were afforded the same immunity, the Lords compared the role of
an ambassador under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations: "a former head of state
enjoys immunities once it ceases for official acts perpetrated while in office." Third, the Lords
answered the issue of whether torture could be considered an official act by ruling that torture
had become an international crime "at least" by December 8, 1988. 90 The Lords held that
Pinochet could only be prosecuted for torture after December 8, 1988, when the waiver of
immunity began. The dissenting Law Lords followed Pinochet I by arguing that international
crimes eliminated immunity and therefore requires no waiver.
The Iraqi Special Tribunal seeks to prosecute former heads of state for crimes committed
while in office. While the British Lords held that immunity was retained for such acts, this
immunity is not absolute: exceptions can be made for crimes of an international character. All
the crimes listed under the IST’s jurisdiction are international crimes.

Several crimes are

prohibited in treaties to which Iraq is a signatory, including the Geneva and Genocide
Conventions. Alternately, it could be argued that those treaties waived immunity. While the
claim that immunity is retained by former heads of state may prove to be a challenge in Iraq, the
entire decision by the British Court is only persuasive authority. The IST justices may choose to
follow the earlier Pinochet I holding, because Pinochet I is more favorable toward prosecution of
international crimes.

C.

Whether Immunity Can Be Expressly Waived by Government Act
1. An Occupying Power’s Authority to Waive Immunity- The Nuremberg Trials
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Waiver was suggested when immunity of heads of state was first restricted. Some argue
that the German leaders were stripped of immunity by the occupying powers rather than their
commission of international violations. 91 The allied powers had total control of Germany at the
close of World War II, and arguably they did not need consent to prosecute German officials.
No Nuremberg Tribunal judicial opinion cites the consent of Germany as the basis for the
tribunal’s jurisdiction. 92 Professor Henry King, a junior prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials,
explained that “[i]t should be noted that the German armies surrendered unconditionally to the
Allies on May 8, 1945. There was no sovereign German government which they dealt in the
surrender arrangements.” 93

Additionally, Professor Hans Kelsen determined that the allied

powers never sought to establish a peace treaty with German leaders because, by the end of
World War II no such authorities existed “since the state of peace has been de facto achieved by
Germany’s disappearance as a sovereign state.” 94
2. Waiver Through Government Action
a.

Express and Implied Waiver- The Marcos Cases

In examining whether head of state immunity applied to Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos,
the US Second Circuit Federal Court of Appeals held in In re Grand Jury Proceedings Doe #700
that the two were not immune from service of process because the Philippine government had
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expressly waived whatever head of state immunity they enjoyed. 95 An express waiver exists
when a nation announces its intention to eliminate head of state immunity by taking specific
actions to that effect.
The Marcoses were accused of embezzling money from the Philippine government.
After Mr. Marcos left office, the two went to the United States and claimed immunity from
compulsory process by virtue of head of state immunity. The Philippine government issued a
diplomatic note purporting to expressly waive any residual head of state immunity or diplomatic
immunity enjoyed by Mr. and Mrs. Marcos. This waiver can also be viewed as implicit because
the Philippines declined to intercede on behalf of their own leaders. 96 In explaining the reason
for its decision, the Court noted that the doctrine of immunity is grounded in comity and respect
for the sovereignty of nations, both of which would be furthered by following the choice of
waiver and revocation of immunity by the Philippines. The Court also acknowledged the fact
that head of state immunity is primarily an aspect of state sovereignty, and not an individual
right. Basing its decision on the Vienna Convention’s rationale, the Court claimed that “it would
be anomalous indeed if the state had the power to revoke diplomatic immunity but not head of
state immunity.” 97

The Court also recognized head of state immunity as a “fundamental

characteristic of state sovereignty… the right to determine which individuals may raise the flag
of the ship of state and which may not.” 98 The court followed this holding in a second decision
regarding Mr. and Mrs. Marcos, by not allowing immunity on the basis that the Philippines
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waived immunity not once but twice, and that the language of those waivers “could scarcely be
stronger.” 99
b.

Express Waiver- Paul v. Avril

In its decision concerning former Haitian leader Prosper Avril, the Federal District Court
for the Southern District of Florida similarly found that express waivers should be given strong
consideration. The plaintiffs, citizens and residents of Haiti, sued Avril for alleged violations of
customary international law, including torture, cruel and inhuman or degrading treatment, and
arbitrary arrest and detention without trial.

Avril argued that he was immune for actions

committed while he was in office because the crimes were committed within the scope of his
official duties. The express waiver of immunity for Prosper Avril by the Republic of Haiti,
stated that he, “enjoys absolutely no form of immunity.” 100 In reviewing this waiver, the court
noted not only that “the wording of the waiver could hardly be more strenuous,” but also that
“[i]mmunity is a grant in a sense awarded at the sovereign’s discretion.” 101
3. Express Waiver Through Treaties- ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (Pinochet III)
In granting the extradition of former leader Augusto Pinochet, the House of Lords
examined whether it was the intent of Pinochet’s home nation to expressly waive head of state
immunity. Because both Britain and Chile were parties to the Torture Convention, the Law
Lords looked to whether there was language in the law that could be read as a waiver of
immunity.

The Lords held that because “there is no express provision dealing with state

immunity of heads of state, ambassadors or other officials” as parties to the Convention, Chile,
Spain and the United Kingdom were all “bound under treaty by its provisions whether or not
99
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such provisions would apply in the absence of treaty obligation.” 102 The House of Lords also
stated that because the intent of the convention was to prevent heads of state from committing
torture, it would be contrary its goals to invoke state immunity. Pinochet did not have immunity
for his actions until December 8, 1988, a date determined by the Law Lords as the moment when
the Torture Convention went into effect, signifying a waiver of head of state immunity. 103
D.

Whether There Is a Waiver of Immunity in Iraq
The Transitional Administrative Law and the Statute for the Iraqi Special Tribunal may

be viewed jointly as a waiver of immunity for heads of state.

A waiver can be found by

following the precedent set in the Marcos cases, where the court acknowledged that, “[b]ecause
it is the state that gives the power to lead and the ensuing trappings of power--including
immunity--the state may therefore take back that which it bestowed upon its erstwhile
leaders.” 104 Because the Nation of Iraq had earlier bestowed upon its officials such immunity in
the 1970 Constitution, it was within the state’s power to take immunity away at any time.
Accordingly, Iraq legally and expressly waived immunity. Furthermore, waiver will apply to all
individuals included in Article 15(c) and to all crimes included in Articles 11 to 14. 105
Defendants may argue that they will be permitted to retain immunity for actions taken
while in office under Yerodia and the last Pinochet decision. This argument can be rebuffed by
the fact that the waiver intended to eliminate immunity only for criminal acts not considered
official acts of office. The TAL expressly states that “[n]o official or employee of the Iraqi
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Transitional Government shall enjoy immunity for criminal acts committed while in office,” 106
and that rule applies only to acting heads of state. In addition the Statute of the IST claims
jurisdiction over “any Iraqi national or resident of Iraq accused of the crimes listed in Articles 11
to 14, committed since July 17, 1968 and up until and including May 1, 2003 in the territory of
the Republic of Iraq or elsewhere.” 107 This statute leaves very little room for exceptions.
The defendants also may claim that they were illegally removed from office, making any
charges against them subsequently improper. The events following World War II in Germany
are applicable here, because the world’s nations acted to remove those who were committing
international crimes. Iraq as a nation might be considered temporarily non-sovereign. Unable to
make a waiver, this classification would require the United Nations and the American Coalition
to “assist the people Iraq in their efforts to reform their institutions and rebuild their country.” 108
Although the occupation in Iraq has ended and authority rests with a democratically elected
government, an occupying power can prosecute crimes under international law that predated the
occupation.

While the international community prosecuted accused Nazi war criminals in

occupied Germany at Nuremberg, this prosecution did not prevent the re-installed democratic
government from also prosecuting accused war criminals in domestic courts.

The new

government of Iraq, following the occupation, retains the right to prosecute heads of state,
working through international or domestic courts.
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VII. Whether the Iraqi Special Tribunal is an International Court
A.

Characteristics of International Courts
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, the International Military Tribunal for

the Far East, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the International
Criminal Court are all considered to be international criminal courts. The primary reason for
such a determination is that they are recognized by the world as such. The first two courts set
precedents by asserting jurisdiction over individuals who committed crimes of a universal nature.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda were founded by the United Nations, an international body itself, supported
and comprised of representatives from many nations. The Special Court for Sierra Leone was
founded jointly by the United Nations and the nation of Sierra Leone.

The International

Criminal Court was founded “in relationship with the United Nations system.” 109 Jurisdiction
for international courts is not territorial; the accused and their victims can be from any nation.
Subject matter jurisdiction for these courts is universal; crimes must be “serious violations of
international humanitarian law” 110 and “of concern to the international community as a
whole.” 111
B.

Characteristics of Domestic Courts
Courts established by independent nations to hear cases and interpret the laws of that

individual nation are domestic courts.
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international matters. It compels them not to “sit in judgment on the acts of the government of
another done within its own territory.” 112 Domestic courts are therefore limited to deciding cases
in which subject matter or personal jurisdiction can be established.
1. Subject Matter Jurisdictional Requirements
Establishing subject matter jurisdiction in a domestic court requires that the crime take
place within the national borders of that court. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
notes that territoriality, either where the acts commenced or where the effects occur, are of
primary importance in establishing jurisdiction. 113 The IST is given jurisdiction over crimes that
occurred against Iraqis, either inside or outside of Iraqi territory. 114
2. Personal Jurisdiction Requirements
Establishing personal jurisdiction in a domestic court requires that the accused or the
victim have ties to the nation in which the court is located, although different courts apply
different theories in accepting whether sufficient ties exist for the court to establish jurisdiction.
If establishing jurisdiction through nationality, a court will look to the perpetrator’s nationality,
such that the laws of a nation follow nationals wherever they go. Passive personality jurisdiction
relies on the victim’s nationality to establish sufficient ties. 115

As expressed earlier, ICJ

President Guillaume commented in Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium that
international criminal courts were developed as remedies to cure the ills of national courts, with
international court jurisdiction established by treaty or an international body, having no effect
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upon domestic court jurisdiction.” 116 The Statute of the IST states in Article 1(b) that the
Tribunal has “jurisdiction over any Iraqi national or resident of Iraq accused of the crimes
listed…” 117
C.

Determining the Status of a Court- Whether The Special Court for Sierra Leone is
an International Court
1. Establishment, Jurisdiction and Authority
The Special Court for Sierra Leone is a unique court that has been described as a hybrid

international-domestic court but which was ultimately determined by its own justices to be an
international court. 118 The Special Court was established through an agreement between the
United Nations and the Sierra Leonean government pursuant to the Charter of the United Nations
Articles 39 and 41 and Security Council Resolution 1315 119 in August 2000 to prosecute those
responsible for violations of international humanitarian and Sierra Leonean law that took place in
Sierra Leone beginning on November 30, 1996. 120 The Agreement and this subject matter
jurisdiction render this tribunal an international court. 121
The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone could also be interpreted as specifically
waiving head of state immunity by domestic authorities in stating that “[t]he official position of
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any accused persons, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible government
official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.” 122
The court’s primacy further verifies that the Special Court for Sierra Leone is an
international court. The Court and the national courts of Sierra Leone were given concurrent
jurisdiction, but the Special Court was granted primacy over the national courts, as international
courts often are. 123 While one of the three judges in the Trial Chamber was appointed by the
Government of Sierra Leone, two were chosen by the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
and two of the five Appeals Chamber judges were appointed by the Government of Sierra Leone
with an additional three by the Secretary-General. 124 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence
adopted by the Court are similar to those of the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda. 125
The Secretary-General appointed the Prosecutor, to be assisted by a Sierra Leonean-appointedDeputy Prosecutor and other Sierra Leonean and international staff as required.126 The Court is
under international supervision, with the President of the Special Court ordered to submit an
annual report to the Secretary-General and to the Government of Sierra Leone. 127
Ultimately, it was the international community that took the initiative to construct the
Special Court for Sierra Leone. The preamble to Security Council Resolution 1315 states that,
“the international community will exert every effort to bring those responsible to justice in
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accordance with international standards of justice, fairness and due process of law.” 128 The
domestic authorities do play a great part in the Special Court’s authority and implementation,
perhaps arguably to a greater deal than did the individual nations of Germany, Yugoslavia and
Rwanda in their respective ad hoc tribunals. Yet, like those tribunals, the Special Court of Sierra
Leone has “the characteristics associated with classical international organisations (sic),” and as
such “there is no reason to conclude that the Special Court should be treated as anything other
than an international tribunal or court, with all that implies for the question of immunity for a
serving Head of State.” 129
2. The Special Court for Sierra Leone’s First Prosecution- The Case Against Charles
Ghankay Taylor
Charles Ghankay Taylor, the President of the Republic of Liberia from 1997 to 2003, was
indicted on seventeen counts, including crimes against humanity, and grave breaches of the
Geneva Convention. 130 The Prosecution maintained that, “from an early stage and acting in a
private rather than an official capacity he resourced and directed rebel forces, encouraging them
in campaigns of terror, torture and mass murder…” 131 The Court held that his position as
incumbent head of state did not shield him from prosecution or service of process, and that the
intent of the Statute of the Special Court was clear: to prosecute those who bore the greatest
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian and Sierra Leonean law. The
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Special Court for Sierra Leone asserted for itself that it is an international court, with all rights
and privileges thereof. 132
3. Reasserting the Special Court for Sierra Leone’s Rights as an International CourtProsecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman
Sam Hinga Norman was accused of enlisting children as soldiers, a violation of
international humanitarian law, and brought before the Special Court for Sierra Leone, where he
claimed that the court lacked the jurisdiction to try him for such crimes. The court found several
sources of authority in international law under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, which it scrutinized. 133 The court stated that international conventions, whether
general or particular, established rules especially recognized by the contesting states and by
international custom, which led the Court to determine that the court had jurisdiction to try Mr.
Norman for international humanitarian crimes.134

Upon making this formulation, and in

following the precedent established in Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Charles Taylor that the
Special Court is an International Court, the court stated its rationale:
Such crimes are limited to the breaches of the Geneva Convention which violate
Common Article 3, and to other specified conduct which has been
comprehensively and clearly identified as an international law crime: treaties or
State practice or other methods of demonstrating the consensus of the
international community that they are so destructive of the dignity of humankind
that individuals accused of committing them must be put on trial, if necessary in
international courts. 135
The Norman case re-affirms the obligation that the nation of Sierra Leone, as an international
court, is required to prevent and prosecute violations of treaties to which Sierra Leone was a
132

Id. at para. 41.

133

Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Sam Hinga Norman, SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), 31 May 2004, para. 9. [Reproduced
in accompanying notebook II at Tab 33]

134

Id.

135

Id. at para. 35. (emphasis added)

39

party, in addition to all international crimes.

Depending on whether Iraq is found to be an

international court, it may have the same affirmative duty.
D.

Determination of the Iraqi Special Tribunal
Making the determination regarding the IST statute’s status is complicated because there

is evidence supporting its establishment as both an international and a domestic court.
1. The Iraqi Special Tribunal is Sufficiently Internationalized to Be Considered an
International Court
a. Evidence of the Iraqi Special Tribunal as an International Court
The Statute of the IST contains several provisions that point to the IST as having been
established as an international court. Article 1(a) of the Statute states that the Tribunal “shall be
an independent entity and not associated with any Iraqi government departments.” 136 There can
be no appeals to the Iraqi Court system.

The IST has jurisdiction over universal crimes

committed between July 17, 1968 and May 1, 2003 only, as stated in Article 10, with each of
four recognized crimes- genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and violations of certain
Iraqi laws- listed in Article 14, and further described in Articles 11 through 14. 137 This temporal
subject matter limitation is in agreement with the other international ad hoc tribunals.
Articles 17(b)-(c) of the Statute for the Iraqi Special Tribunal both indicate the
significance of international authority. Article 17(b) states that the court “may resort to the
relevant decisions of international courts or other tribunals as persuasive authority for their
decisions.” 138 The Iraqi Criminal Code should be interpreted consistently with the Statute of the
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Tribunal and “international legal obligations concerning the crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal,” according to Article 17(c). 139
The Iraqi Special Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence list requirements for
international assistance at all levels, although the rules do not have a requirement for the use of
international judges.

The Rules state that, “Non-Iraqi Advisors/Observers, appointed in

accordance with the Statute, will be assigned to the Prosecutions Department, Investigative
Judges, the Trial Chambers and the Appeals Chamber.” 140 The Rules themselves are similar to
the Rules of the International Courts for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia and the Special
Court for Sierra Leone in that they trump the domestic codes of Criminal Procedure.
b. Implications of the Iraqi Special Tribunal as an International Court
As an international court, the IST will have powers similar to other international criminal
and especially ad hoc tribunals. As an international court, the IST, like the ICTY and ICTR, was
granted jurisdiction over all persons accused of international crimes that took place during a
specific period of time. This means that the Court cannot prosecute any other crimes. The
Court’s primary purpose is to try those accused of international crimes that may or may not be
statutorily listed as crimes within the local law but must be enforced as crimes of collective
condemnation.
Territorially, the IST will be able to prosecute all perpetrators of listed crimes regardless
of where they have gone since committing said crimes, as long as those crimes are connected to
events linked to Iraq. While the Statute for the IST includes only nationals and residents of
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Iraq, 141 personal jurisdiction should give way to the more important universal subject matter
jurisdiction to allow for prosecution of international crimes. The IST can be viewed in the
context of ICJ President Guillaume’s statement in Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium,
being an international criminal court developed as a remedy to cure the ills of the presently
Ba’athist-tainted national courts with international jurisdiction established jointly by
international and domestic influences, with no effect upon domestic court jurisdiction. 142 He
also expressly noted the limitations of domestic jurisdiction, requiring that the offender or the
victim be a national of the asserting State, unless the crime threatens the country’s internal or
external security. 143 The gap that international courts fill prevents heads of state from violating
their own or other nations’ citizens under color of law, because domestic courts could not assert
jurisdiction without disturbing sovereignty.
If the court is deemed to be an international court (or perhaps even a domestic court) the
accused could maintain that the court was set up by occupying forces with no authority to do so.
The Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention define and limit the power of
occupying authorities. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations grants an occupying power the right
to “restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.” 144 United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 1483 and 1511 give the CPA the authority to reconstruct Iraqi society to “promote
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the welfare of the Iraqi people through effective administration of the territory,” 145 which
includes the establishment of courts to prosecute ordinary and international crimes, with or
without the international community’s direct supervision. The IST and the CPA were given
other authority that must also be considered.
2. The Iraq Special Tribunal is a Domestic Court
a. Evidence of the Iraqi Special Tribunal as a Domestic Court
As stated earlier, the Statute of the IST in Article 1(b) grants only national jurisdiction. 146
The statute also grants passive personality jurisdiction, because it “includes jurisdiction over
crimes listed in Articles 12 and 13 committed against the people of Iraq,” regardless of where
such crimes occurred, “in the territory of the Republic of Iraq or elsewhere.” 147 No mention is
made of prosecuting crimes that do not include either victims or perpetrators who are not Iraqi
nationals or residents.
Article 17(a) of the Statute for the IST indicates that domestic law was used in making
the Statute’s principles. It lists Iraqi criminal laws, including the Baghdadi Criminal Code of
1919 and the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Law. 148 These facts were true of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone as well, and not enough to persuade that court of its status as a domestic court.
Professor Michael Kelly argues that the Court is a domestic Iraqi court because it exists
within the Iraqi judicial system under Iraqi government authority.149 He adds that while the
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judges are appointed by the Iraqi government, non-Iraqis may be included, but appointment of
non-Iraqi foreign “advisors” is required to assist the judges.
b. Implications of the Iraqi Special Tribunal as a Domestic Court
Nationals who are prosecuted by their own court system under international law do not
enjoy criminal immunity because the courts have the authority to hear cases against their own
nationals. Because the Special Court for Sierra Leone was determined to be an international
court, it was able to indict Charles Taylor, a foreign head of state. 150 As long as the IST only
seeks to prosecute heads of state who are Iraqi nationals, the court’s authority will not be
affected, regardless of whether it is a domestic or international court.
As a domestic Iraqi court, the IST would not have to grant immunities. The elected
government could choose to waive such immunities through either an express statement to such
effect, as did the Philippines in In Re Doe, and as Iraq arguably did in the TAL, or by implied
waiver simply by prosecuting, as did the Philippines.

An implied waiver by the Iraqi

government would be evident in its confirmation of the IST Statute, (which does away with head
of state immunity) in its funding of the IST, the building of its courthouse and in the indictments
that it issued.
Negatively, as a Domestic Iraqi Court, the IST may have problems asserting jurisdiction
over those who have left Iraq and who must be extradited from those other nations. The IST’s
assertion of territorial jurisdiction regarding crimes that occurred within Iraqi territory poses few
issues. The Court also claims to have national jurisdiction concerning crimes committed in Iran
and Kuwait by Iraqi nationals. Article 1(b) of the IST charter claims authority over of “any Iraqi
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national or resident of Iraq… in the territory of the Republic of Iraq or elsewhere” 151 and passive
personality jurisdiction over those who have “committed crimes against the people of Iraq.” 152
These last assertions may pose problems considering the fact that the nations harboring those
individuals may not wish to extradite, such as Britain declined to do for Spain when it asserted
jurisdiction over Augusto Pinochet for crimes committed in Chile against Spaniards. There, the
British Court asserted that it was not the victims’ home nation that allowed jurisdiction, but the
nation in which the crimes allegedly occurred. While the IST Statute asserts jurisdiction over
crimes committed against Iraqis occurring outside of Iraq, such as in Iran or Kuwait, assertion of
jurisdiction may not present the same problem, with many crimes being committed in Iraq.
If the Special Court is considered a domestic rather than an international court, heads of
state enjoy criminal immunity under international law in their own country’s courts only if the
government waives it. In Clinton v. Jones, the US Supreme Court stated that, based on the U.S.
doctrine of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, an official's absolute
immunity was limited only to acts in performance of particular functions of his office. It was the
responsibility of federal courts to determine the legality of unofficial conduct. 153 Addressing the
debate surrounding immunity and national courts, the Court in Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Belgium stated that,
The Court has also examined the rules concerning the immunity or criminal
responsibility of persons having an official capacity contained in the legal
instruments creating international criminal tribunals, and which are specifically
applicable to the latter…. 154 It finds that these rules likewise do not enable it to
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conclude that any such an exception exists in customary international law in
regard to national courts. 155
The Statute of the IST could be deemed a waiver of immunity by the domestic
authorities. By that view, a former head of state does not enjoy immunity for violations of
international humanitarian law that are outside the scope of a head of state’s official functions.
The Yerodia court explained that the individual holds no criminal immunity under international
law as implemented and tried in his own country’s court system. It also noted that the state that
the official represents waives his immunity. 156 As the CPA was granted authority by the United
Nations Security Council to govern, that authority should include the right to waive immunity as
a domestic power.

VIII. Conclusion
The Coalition Provisional Council has the authority to allow the IST to prosecute heads
of state and former heads of state because the Statute for the IST should be deemed a waiver of
immunity by the domestic authorities. Even without the authority to remove immunities, the IST
can prosecute all crimes prohibited in the treaties to which Iraq is a party because no head of
state enjoys criminal immunity in his or her own country’s courts when that nation has ratified a
treaty to such effect. In addition, some courts have held that immunity cannot be used as a
defense when wrongs of an international nature are committed. The Iraqi Special Tribunal
would have different authority depending on whether it is an international or domestic court.
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Regardless of the court’s status, immunity can be eliminated as a defense and the Court will not
be prevented from prosecuting any accused heads of state.
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